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MURKY SKIES AHEAD! ANALYZING EXECUTIVE
AUTHORITY AND FUTURE POLICIES REGARDING
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE OF GREENHOUSE GASES
CHANDLER CRENSHAW*
INTRODUCTION
Should the CEO of a large public corporation be required to inform
investors whether or not he or she eats oranges? This classical question
posed by many corporate lawyers regarding disclosure requirements may
seem like an oddity, but the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
requires corporations to disclose material information of importance to
investors.1 Steven Davidoff Solomon, a Berkeley law professor, describes
the current law of materiality as “murky” and “quirky.”2 Defining materi-
ality, he sarcastically comments, “It’s all a matter of materiality.”3
A lack of a bright-line test for materiality sparked a growing move-
ment to broaden disclosure requirements. Some lawyers insist the health
of a CEO should be included.4 Similarly, environmentalists embrace the
approach that materiality should be interpreted broadly. In their fight
to curb climate change, environmentalists want corporate boards to in-
form investors of the amount of greenhouse gas emissions produced by
its business.5
Authorized by a congressional statute, the SEC requires corpora-
tions through its Regulation S-K to disclose all material information that
* Chandler Payne Crenshaw is a William & Mary JD 2018 candidate and a BA 2014
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1 Steven D. Solomon, In Corporate Disclosure, a Murky Definition of Material, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Apr. 5, 2011), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/in-corporate-disclo
sure-a-murky-definition-of-material/ [https://perma.cc/KKP9-E8KV].
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 David Sarno & Walter Hamilton, Apple’s silence on Steve Jobs’ health may have broken
federal securities rules, L.A. TIMES (June 25, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jun
/25/business/fi-apple-jobs25 [https://perma.cc/M6UG-UXJ6].
5 Letter from Henry M. Paulson, Robert E. Rubin & George P. Shultz, Risky Business
Project, to Brent J. Fields, SEC Secretary 2 (July 20, 2016) (emphasis omitted), http://
www.eenews.net/assets/2016/07/22/document_cw_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/52NB-75WT]
[hereinafter Paulson, Rubin & Shultz].
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may be of interest to investors.6 Material disclosures typically consist of
information investors would or should like to know about companies,
such as ongoing lawsuits, that will ultimately influence the price of the
company’s stock.7
Adhering to these concerns of environmentalist groups, the SEC
in 2010 published interpretative guidelines signaling greenhouse gas
emissions may be deemed material.8 Future rules may be issued. In a
report released in early 2016, the SEC considered proposing new rules
to expand the requirements of material disclosures to include greenhouse
gas emissions.9 The agency argued climate change influences business,
and investors of corporations need to know what business decisions are
being made regarding greenhouse gas emissions.10 Currently, a rule has
yet to be promulgated.
Due to a lack of clarity from the SEC, a growing divide now exists
among environmentalists and the business community. Members of Con-
gress, a few state attorneys general, and environmental coalitions lobbied
the SEC for stricter rules.11 On the other hand, some business authorities
remain concerned about the SEC overreaching in its authority.12
This Note will address whether greenhouse gases should be con-
sidered a material disclosure for corporations under current SEC regula-
tions. Upon review of Regulation S-K and case law, the SEC should avoid
labeling emissions of greenhouse gases as “material” information for
investors. While the SEC may have the best intentions in suggesting
corporations disclose greenhouse gases as a way to highlight the issue of
global warming, thereby reducing carbon dioxide emissions into the at-
mosphere, the call to propose a rule based on current law could lead to
6 See Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.101 (2011).
7 Id.
8 See generally SEC, COMMISSION GUIDANCE REGARDING DISCLOSURE RELATED TO CLI-
MATE CHANGE, SEC Interpretation, Release Nos. 33-9106, 34-61469, FR-82 (Feb. 8, 2010),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DK2-M6LF] (providing
guidance to public companies regarding the Commission’s existing disclosure require-
ments as they apply to climate change matters).
9 See generally Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, SEC
Interpretive Letter, Release Nos. 33-10064, 34-77599 (2016), https://www.sec.gov/rules
/concept/2016/33-10064.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4FA-M4DR] (seeking public comment on
modernizing certain business and financial disclosure requirements in Regulation S-K).
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 David Gelles, S.E.C. Is Criticized for Lax Enforcement of Climate Risk Disclosure, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/business/energy-environment
/sec-is-criticized-for-lax-enforcement-of-climate-risk-disclosure.html.
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information overload for investors and ultimately be ruled immaterial by
the courts.
Ultimately, either Congress or the states should pass legislation
in order for corporate disclosures to be considered material for investors
on this issue. However, recent political shifts at both the federal and state
levels may make the future of passing such statutes unclear. Environ-
mental groups may be pressed to achieve disclosure through non-govern-
mental means. Environmental groups should engage with corporations
directly, raise awareness of societal impact issues with investors, and
advocate for change through the political process.
I. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION’S DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS
The SEC requires certain corporate disclosures through its Regu-
lation S-K.13 The following section will present a brief history of the SEC
and Regulation S-K. In addition, proposed changes to Regulation S-K
regarding climate change amendments will be analyzed.
A. The SEC and Regulation S-K
During the Great Depression, Congress established the Securities
and Exchange Commission with the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934.14 The SEC states its mission “is to protect
investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate
capital formation.”15 Through the Corporate Finance Office, the SEC reg-
ulates corporate disclosure.16 The office dictates, “[Public corporations]
with more than $10 million in assets whose securities are held by more
than 500 owners must file annual and other periodic reports.”17
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 reads: “It shall be unlawful
for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit
to state any material fact necessary . . . in connection with . . . any so-
licitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer,
13 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.101.
14 See 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1934); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1934).
15 SEC, What We Do, https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml [https://perma.cc/9J8X
-ZJ5H] (last modified June 10, 2013).
16 Id.
17 SEC, The Laws That Govern The Securities Industry, https://www.sec.gov/answers
/about-lawsshtml.html [https://perma.cc/9J8X-ZJ5H] (last modified Oct. 1, 2013).
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request, or invitation.”18 The SEC may create rules and regulations to en-
force this act.19
The SEC promulgated Regulation S-K to require corporations to
disclose specific information to the federal government.20 Initially, the SEC
held two disclosure regimes under the two authorization statutes passed
during the Great Depression, and Regulation S-K harmonized disclosure
requirements into one location.21 This single, integrated disclosure sys-
tem went into effect in 1977.22
B. Current Regulation S-K Enforcement
The first Regulation S-K only required two disclosures: a description
of the business and a description of properties.23 Over the years, Regula-
tion S-K grew to contain twenty-seven disclosure requirements.24 Regard-
ing the goal of Regulation S-K, the SEC writes, “[T]he Commission may
exercise its rulemaking authority to prescribe additional information or
may permit prescribed information to be omitted as it deems necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”25
These disclosures must be placed on the form known as Regulation S-X.26
The SEC views the disclosure requirements as a balancing test.27
On one hand, the SEC designed Regulation S-K to reduce information
asymmetry, allowing investors to make voting decisions with more accu-
rate share prices, less fraud, and a better understanding of the corpora-
tion as a whole.28 On the other hand, the SEC writes, “There is also a
possibility that high levels of immaterial disclosure can obscure impor-
tant information or reduce incentives for certain market participants to
trade or create markets for securities.”29 Disclosure should attempt to not
shift too far toward either extreme.30
18 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 112-158, § 14(e) (1934) (as amended 2012).
19 Id.
20 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.101.
21 See Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, supra note 9, at 10.
22 Id. at 12.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 13.
25 Id.
26 Application of Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-01(2011).
27 See Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, supra note 9, at
13–15.
28 Id. at 13–14.
29 Id. at 14.
30 Id. at 15.
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The SEC may use four sections of Regulation S-K for potential
environmental law reform.31 First, Item 101 of Regulation S-K requires
the description of the corporation’s business.32 Requirements under busi-
ness disclosures include material changes in employment, assets on hand,
acquisitions, corporate restructuring, and the narrative of a business,
including trademarks, patents, and raw materials.33 The regulation also
states: “Appropriate disclosure also shall be made as to the material ef-
fects that compliance with Federal, State and local provisions which have
been enacted or adopted regulating the discharge of materials into the
environment, or otherwise relating to the protection of the environment.”34
Smaller companies must also report requirements of compliance with
environmental laws.35
Second, Item 103 requires any pending lawsuits or routine litiga-
tion incidental to the business to be reported.36 Litigation involving
environmental law is not considered routine unless the proceeding is
material to the business, the lawsuit exceeds 10% of current assets of the
registrant, or sanctions more than $100,000 are placed on the corpora-
tion.37 Otherwise, the lawsuits need not be reported for environmental
purposes.38
Third, Item 503 requires risk factors to be disclosed.39 Risk factors
include a lack of an operating history, lack of profitable operations in
recent periods, financial positions, business or proposed business, and
securities markets, among others.40 Item 503 does not specifically address
adhering to environmental regulations.41
Finally, Item 303 requires a management’s discussion and analy-
sis of financial conditions and results of operations.42 This section re-
quires the reporting of contractual obligations, including long-term debt
obligations, capital lease obligations, operating leases, and purchasing
31 See COMMISSION GUIDANCE REGARDING DISCLOSURE RELATED TO CLIMATE CHANGE,
supra note 8, at 12–13, 15.
32 17 C.F.R. § 229.101.
33 Id.
34 See id. § 229.101(c)(xii).
35 See id. § 229.101(h)(xi).
36 See id. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2011).
37 See id. § 229.103(5) Instruction 5 to Item 103.
38 Id.
39 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.503 (2011).
40 See id. § 229.503(c)(1)–(5).
41 Id.
42 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2011).
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operations.43 Corporations must disclose material changes in operations.44
Similar to Item 503, Item 303 mentions nothing explicitly regarding
environmental laws or regulations.45
C. The Disclosure of Greenhouse Gases Debate
In 2010, the SEC published guidance documents regarding disclo-
sure requirements for climate change.46 The SEC wrote, “For some com-
panies, the regulatory, legislative and other developments . . . [climate
change] could have a significant effect on operating and financial deci-
sions[.]”47 Corporations may eventually need to consider physical changes
in the land, pending legislation, risk factors such as increased costs, and
international accords while adhering to Regulation S-K.48
Corporations may be required to disclose greenhouse gases based
on Item 101, Item 103, Item 303, and Item 503 of Regulation S-K.49 The
SEC clarified:
This interpretive release is intended to remind companies
of their obligations under existing federal securities laws
and regulations to consider climate change and its conse-
quences as they prepare disclosure documents to be filed
with us and provided to investors. We will monitor the
impact of this interpretive release on company filings as
part of our ongoing disclosure review program.50
Initially viewed as strengthening corporate disclosure laws, the
2010 documents received little attention from the SEC, leading many en-
vironmental groups to criticize a lack of enforcement of the climate change
disclosure regime.51 Regarding the 2010 guidelines, the SEC reduced its
comment letters to large corporations from forty-nine in 2011 to zero in
2013.52 One commenter noted, “[T]he S.E.C. had taken its eye off the ball.”53
43 Id. § 229.303(a)(5).
44 Id. § 229.303(b)(1)–(2).
45 See generally id. § 229.303.
46 See generally COMMISSION GUIDANCE REGARDING DISCLOSURE RELATED TO CLIMATE
CHANGE, supra note 8.
47 Id. at 5.
48 Id. at 5–6, 24–26.
49 Id. at 22.
50 Id. at 27.
51 Gelles, supra note 12.
52 Id.
53 Id.
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In 2015, thirty-five members of Congress wrote SEC chair Mary
Jo White a letter desiring enforcement and clarification.54 The letter de-
mands the SEC clarify its position on the guidance documents by asking
questions about compliance, enforcement, and communication with large
corporations about disclosures.55 In addition, a coalition of sixty-two
institutional investors also wrote a letter to the SEC chair in 2015 and
called for stricter enforcement rules for disclosure.56 The coalition hoped
the SEC would improve its reporting on carbon asset risks in an effort to
curb greenhouse gas emissions.57
As a response to this inaction on the guidance documents, a debate
grew nationally regarding the SEC’s role in greenhouse gas emissions.
In 2016, three former secretaries of the United States Treasury wrote a
letter to the SEC advocating, “[W]e recommend that the Commission now
move to promote and enforce mandatory and meaningful disclosures of
the material effects of climate change on issuers, and also that the SEC
work to provide more industry-specific guidance on how to account for
climate risk.”58
Toward the other extreme, the R Street organization opposes any
further regulations.59 The group stresses required disclosures relating to
greenhouse gas emissions are immaterial for a reasonable investor to know
before voting.60 In 2016, they concluded, “Here, the [Obama] White House
doesn’t even pretend that this is in any way about protecting investors. At
best, requiring companies to disclose immaterial risks amounts to pointless
paperwork. At worst, it paints a target on some companies’ backs[.]”61
The United States Chamber of Commerce takes the approach that
increasing disclosures leads to information overload for investors.62 The
54 See generally Letter from 35 Members of Congress to Mary Jo White, SEC Chair
(Oct. 29, 2015), https://cartwright.house.gov/sites/cartwright.house.gov/files/SEC%20
Climate%20Letter%20October%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/53BP-7T7X].
55 Id.
56 See generally Letter, Inadequate Carbon Asset Risk Disclosure by Oil and Gas Com-
panies, to Mary Jo White, SEC Chair (Apr. 17, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7
-06-16/s70616-214.pdf [https://perma.cc/FB8D-WGPU].
57 Id.
58 Paulson, Rubin & Shultz, supra note 5.
59 R.J. Lehmann, White House overreaches with SEC climate disclosure plan, R STREET
INST. (Aug. 18, 2016) (emphasis omitted), http://www.rstreet.org/2016/08/18/white-house
-overreaches-with-sec-climate-disclosure-plan/ [https://perma.cc/9BEQ-JGNZ].
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CORPORATE DISCLOSURE EFFECTIVENESS: ENSURING A
BALANCED SYSTEM THAT INFORMS AND PROTECTS INVESTORS AND FACILITATES CAPITAL
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Regulation S-K process should be leaner and simpler in order to not confuse
investors.63 They conclude, “While it is appropriate for disclosure require-
ments to evolve, it also is important that they do so in a manner that
retains the focus on information that is important to a reasonable investor’s
ability to understand and evaluate a business.”64
The Business Roundtable offers a similar argument, believing in-
formation overload is detrimental to investors.65 Corporations addressing
societal issues with disclosure regimes are immaterial and speculative
at best toward achieving desired ends.66 They cite a rule procured by the
Dodd-Frank Act regarding conflict diamonds that required corporations
who may have had slight traces of diamonds mined from the Democratic
Republic of Congo to disclose.67 Ultimately, this rule cost corporations
$3–4 billion dollars to implement and deterred corporations from extract-
ing from mines led by non-warlord groups in the country.68 Placing a
“scarlet letter” on the region, the Business Roundtable writes, “Despite
good intentions, evidence is mounting that the conflict minerals rule is
actually exacerbating the problem in the DRC.”69 Similarly, while the SEC
may have good intentions for requiring corporations to disclose greenhouse
gases, compliance issues and negative externalities could lead to crip-
pling economic effects.
In response, the SEC in 2016 issued a concept release requesting
corporations to comment on disclosure regimes for emissions of green-
house gases.70 The questions asked were as follows: whether current
climate change–related disclosures are insufficient, whether existing
disclosure requirements are adequate to elicit the information that would
permit investors to evaluate material climate change risk, and additional
FORMATION 4 (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/021053_ccmc
_disclosure.pdf [https://perma.cc/ER6Z-V54C].
63 Id.
64 Id. at 24.
65 BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, THE MATERIALITY STANDARD FOR PUBLIC COMPANY DISCLO-
SURE: MAINTAIN WHAT WORKS 8 (Oct. 2015), http://businessroundtable.org/sites/default
/files/reports/Materiality%20White%20Paper%20FINAL%2009-29-15.pdf [https://perma
.cc/VB3L-KA66].
66 Id.
67 Id. at 8–9.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 9.
70 Clare Condon, SEC Aims to Change Climate Risk Disclosure Rules, EHS DAILY ADVISOR
(May 25, 2016), http://ehsdailyadvisor.blr.com/2016/05/sec-aims-to-change-climate-risk
-disclosure-rules/ [https://perma.cc/Z6HZ-RCYF].
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disclosure requirements or guidance that would be appropriate to elicit
that information.71
The SEC has yet to take action on these comments, and responses
could be used to propose a new rule under the Administrative Procedure
Act or create a new disclosure regime.72 While uncertain about what an
exact rule may be, business community leaders will no doubt raise the
issue in court. Determining whether or not greenhouse gas emissions are
considered material for investors will be critical for the survival of a rule
or disclosure regime.73
II. REGULATION S-K AND THE COURTS
The following section will focus on the Supreme Court’s interpreta-
tion of “materiality” as a fact-inquiry test. Recent proposals for Regulation
S-K regarding materiality of greenhouse gas emissions will be discussed
under this framework. While environmentalists present a strong argu-
ment for “materiality,” courts remain reluctant to allow agency deference
in environmental law cases.
A. What is Materiality?
At the center of this debate is the meaning of the word material
throughout Regulation S-K. Three major rules exist regarding material-
ity for SEC disclosures. Securities Act Rule 408 requires material infor-
mation be included in a registrant statement.74 Regarding the express
content of these statements, the rule reads, “[T]here shall be added such
further material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the
required statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they
are made, not misleading.”75 Exchange Act Rule 12b-20 echoes Rule
408.76 Lastly, Rule 10b-5 expands the sentiment of the previous two rules
by making it unlawful to disclose misleading or untrue statements that
71 Id.
72 See Tyler Gellasch, Towards a Sustainable Economy: A Review of Comments to the SEC’s
Disclosure Effectiveness Concept Release 14 (Sept. 2016), https://www.citizen.org/sites/de
fault/files/sustainableeconomyreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4Z8-W8KH].
73 See id. at 19–20.
74 17 C.F.R. § 230.408(a) (2011).
75 Id.
76 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (2011).
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are material.77 Despite raising the importance of materiality, the SEC
failed to define “material.”78
The Supreme Court shed light on the definition of “material” in
cases over the past few decades. In the TSC Industries, Inc. case, the
Supreme Court, hearing an insider trading case, clarified, “An omitted
fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.”79 Proof
of shareholder opinion is not required to prove materiality, rather “the
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information
made available.”80 The Supreme Court rejected a circuit court materiality
test which required all facts of importance be disclosed.81 Rather, the test
should focus on the significance of a fact and not a comprehensive list of
all facts.82
A decade later, the Supreme Court addressed materiality in the
Basic case, reaffirming the standard set forth in TSC Industries.83 This
case focused on mergers, and the Court ruled the test covers all SEC
materiality requirements.84 In its decision, the Court stated, “Whether
merger discussions in any particular case are material therefore depends
on the facts.”85 The test should be viewed as a fact-specific inquiry.86
The Supreme Court last revisited materiality in 2011.87 In a unan-
imous decision, Justice Sotomayor wrote that a pharmaceutical company
“failed to disclose reports of a possible link between [its] leading product,
a cold remedy, and loss of smell, rendering statements made by Matrixx
misleading.”88 Furthermore, the Court expressed, “[M]ateriality of adverse
event reports cannot be reduced to a bright-line rule. Although in many
cases reasonable investors would not consider reports of adverse events
to be material information, respondents have alleged facts plausibly
suggesting that reasonable investors would have viewed these particular
77 Id. § 240.10b-5(b).
78 Id.
79 TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
80 Id.
81 Id. at 445.
82 Id.
83 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988).
84 Id.
85 Id. at 239.
86 Id. at 240.
87 See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27 (2011).
88 Id. at 30.
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reports as material.”89 This opinion appears to broaden the definition of
materiality, allowing for flexibility and case-by-case inquiries.
The Supreme Court decisions suggest materiality should not be
considered all inclusive. Rather, the test should be an inquiry of signifi-
cant facts that may influence investors. This standard should filter out
irrelevant information.90 The Business Roundtable cites 100 times the
SEC failed to include societal issues as material, arguing, “ ‘[I]t is impos-
sible to provide every item of information that might be of interest to some
investor in making investment and voting decisions.’ ”91 Materiality stan-
dards evolve over time but should not address specific societal concerns
if not of importance to investors.92
B. Greenhouse Gases and Materiality
As noted above, four sections of Regulation S-K may address
climate change.93 Those four items are the description of both business
and legal proceedings, risk factors for investors, and management analy-
sis.94 The SEC believes the following issues may trigger disclosure (pend-
ing legislation and regulations), physical changes to the environment,
risk factors, and adhering to international accords.95 While a rule pro-
mulgated by the 2010 guidelines may allow for investors to become more
aware of climate change, the SEC should limit the scope of materiality
due to the potential for information overload and immateriality concerns.
First, the SEC contends greenhouse gas emissions should be
considered as part of a business description under Item 101 of Regulation
S-K.96 Item 101 requires businesses to disclose and comply with current
environmental laws regarding the discharge of emissions into the atmo-
sphere.97 The 2010 guidelines suggest that legislation such as “cap-and-
trade” should also be taken into consideration as part of a business
description because such legislation could lead to increased costs and
89 Id. at 30–31.
90 BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 65, at 5.
91 Id. at 5–6 (quoting Securities Act Release No. 5627 at 7) (Oct. 14, 1975).
92 Id. at 7–8.
93 COMMISSION GUIDANCE REGARDING DISCLOSURE RELATED TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra
note 8, at 1–2.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 22.
96 Id.
97 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii).
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reduced profits.98 While the “cap-and-trade” concern may have been a
federal issue in 2010, no such legislation has been brought to a vote in
either branch of Congress in the seven years following the issuance of the
guidance documents.99
Current language of Item 101 also requires compliance with laws
regarding emissions but not disclosing a quantifiable amount of actual
emissions.100 Environmentalists hold a strong argument for physical
changes in the land being considered material in business descriptions;
however, business leaders would probably counter-argue such information
is speculative and leads to information overload, voiding it as immate-
rial.101 The Supreme Court in the Basic and Matrixx decisions also stated
materiality should be fact-specific to organizations and should not be all
inclusive.102 Not all businesses would be impacted by changing lands.
While there may be some flexibility and strong arguments on both sides,
disclosing under Item 101 leans more toward societal concerns potentially
leading to negative externalities.103
Second, the SEC’s legal proceedings requirement probably does not
apply. The SEC requires public corporations to disclose all legal proceedings
and investigations involving the company.104 The disclosure of greenhouse
gas emissions is not inherently litigious. A lawsuit against a public com-
pany regarding pollution would be disclosed regardless, and further requir-
ing carbon dioxide emissions to be disclosed for legal purposes would be
both superfluous and not within the scope of the litigation requirement.105
Third, Regulation S-K requires risk factors regarding the organiza-
tion’s operating history, profitable operations, financial position, proposed
business, and involvement in equitable markets.106 While Item 503 does
98 COMMISSION GUIDANCE REGARDING DISCLOSURE RELATED TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra
note 8, at 23–24.
99 CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOL., Congress Climate History, https://www.c2es.org
/content/congress-climate-history [https://perma.cc/Y49B-9H8P]; Erica Martinson, In States,
Cap and Trade Lives On, POLITICO (May 27, 2014, 11:32 PM), http://www.politico.com
/story/2014/05/cap-and-trade-states-107135 [https://perma.cc/G23K-DKM7].
100 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1).
101 BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 65, at 8.
102 See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 563 U.S. at 30; see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
at 236.
103 See, e.g., BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 65, at 8–9 (stating that while the conflict
minerals provision of the Dodd-Frank Act may have been rooted in good intentions, its
execution created unnecessary costs and problems).
104 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.103.
105 See id.
106 See id. § 229.503.
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not specifically mention environmental law, the SEC guidelines state, “Reg-
istrants should consider specific risks they face as a result of climate
change legislation or regulation and avoid generic risk factor disclosure
that could apply to any company.”107 The SEC cites pending legislation
in federal and state governments as examples.108
The terms for risk factors described by the SEC are vague and
highly speculative, leading to information overload for investors. Currently,
no federal climate law is “pending.” In addition, allowing state “pending
legislation” to dictate federal SEC disclosure rules would lead to confu-
sion, as different states have different environmental laws. Following
international accords may hold merit for risk factors; however, the Supreme
Court demonstrated “materiality” is a fact-based inquiry, and business
leaders remain concerned that societal top-down approaches may spur
additional problems.109 The SEC needs to be more concrete on this issue
in order to avoid investor and corporate confusion.
Lastly, the SEC requires corporate disclosures for “Management’s
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Opera-
tions” (“MD&A”).110 The MD&A requirements intend to satisfy three
principal objectives:
[1] to provide a narrative explanation of a registrant’s fi-
nancial statements that enables investors to see the regis-
trant through the eyes of management; [2] to enhance the
overall financial disclosure and provide the context within
which financial information should be analyzed; and [3] to
provide information about the quality of, and potential
variability of, a registrant’s earnings and cash flow, so
that investors can ascertain the likelihood that past per-
formance is indicative of future performance.111
As published in the 2010 guidelines, corporations should first determine
whether pending legislation or regulations are “reasonably likely” to be
107 COMMISSION GUIDANCE REGARDING DISCLOSURE RELATED TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra
note 8, at 22.
108 See id. at 3.
109 See Basic Inc., v. Levinson, 485 U.S. at 232; see also BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra
note 65, at 8.
110 17 C.F.R. § 229.303.
111 COMMISSION GUIDANCE REGARDING DISCLOSURE RELATED TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra
note 8, at 15.
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enacted, and if so, whether such legislation or regulations have a mate-
rial effect on the operation of the business.112
The test is too broad under the SEC’s definition of materiality,
which focuses on whether a reasonable investor would be concerned with
a lack of facts disclosed.113 The test gives too much deference to corporate
boards. A corporation could hypothetically state that “legislation requir-
ing a disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions may be reasonably likely to
pass Congress in the next 10 years, but such disclosures will not influ-
ence operations.”114 Similar to the risk factors test, the SEC needs to focus
more on fact-based inquiries as opposed to introducing a blanket rule in
order to survive judicial scrutiny.
C. The Courts and Agency Deference
Materiality laws have been described as “quirky” and “murky” at
best.115 Although intended to present a clear fact based test, the current
definition allows for ambiguities.116 While not addressing greenhouse gas
disclosures for nearly six years, the SEC seemed interested in pursuing
stricter regulations in 2016 on this issue.117 New rules may come from
the agency.118
As noted above, the revisions to the four items of Regulation S-K
for greenhouse gas disclosure may clash with the Supreme Court’s in-
terpretation of materiality. Because firm arguments exist on both sides
of the debate, the Supreme Court will ultimately decide if reporting green-
house gas emissions are material to corporate disclosure. Recently, both
upper and lower courts failed to give agencies deference on environmen-
tal issues.119
In the 2015 case Michigan v. EPA, the Supreme Court issued an
injunction on a promulgated rule designed by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (“EPA”) to control air pollution from stationary and moving
sources.120 The EPA did not take costs into consideration when drafting
112 Id. at 23.
113 See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 232.
114 See id.
115 Solomon, supra note 1.
116 Id.
117 Condon, supra note 70.
118 See id.
119 See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015); North Dakota v. EPA, No. 3:15-cv-
59, 2015 WL 7422349 (D.N.D. 2015).
120 See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2704.
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the rule, and a regulatory report indicated the it could result in upwards
of $90 billion per year in compliance costs.121
In this case, the Court applied Chevron deference.122 Chevron def-
erence is twofold.123 First, the courts must determine whether the statute
is ambiguous.124 If ambiguous, the courts determine whether the agency
acted reasonably within its authorization in implementing the rule.125
Passing the first prong of the test, the environmental rule failed the
“reasonable” test;126 the Court concluded, “Our reasoning so far estab-
lishes that it was unreasonable for EPA to read [the enabling statute] to
mean that cost is irrelevant to the initial decision to regulate power plants.
The Agency must consider cost . . . .”127 The injunction effectively kills the
rule unless the EPA considers the cost of compliance.128
In 2015, a North Dakota federal district court issued an injunction
on the Waters of the United States (“WOTUS”) rule procured by the EPA.129
The judge held that the agency rule, designed to nationalize the country’s
waterways and water sources, most likely failed the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard.130 The Administrative Procedure Act allows for the courts
to set aside any agency action viewed to be arbitrary and capricious.131
In a separate lawsuit, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the reasoning of the
North Dakota judge and issued a nationwide injunction, halting the
rule’s implementation indefinitely.132 The rule currently awaits Supreme
Court review.133
However, once WOTUS reaches the Supreme Court, it may have
the same fate as the Clean Power Plan, which the Supreme Court stayed
121 Id. at 2706.
122 Id. at 3706–07.
123 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1974).
124 Id. at 842–43.
125 Id.
126 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2711.
127 Id.
128 Jonathan H. Adler, Supreme Court smacks EPA for ignoring costs, but mercury rule
likely to persevere, WASH. POST (June 30, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/30/supreme-court-smacks-epa-for-ignoring-costs-but-mer
cury-rule-likely-to-persevere/?utm_term=.760f85cd46cf [https://perma.cc/5GYJ-QJAR].
129 North Dakota v. EPA, 2015 WL 7422349, at *1, *12 (D.N.D. 2015).
130 Id. at *12.
131 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966).
132 In re EPA and Dep’t of Def. Final Rule, 803 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 2015).
133 Katie Bennett Hobson & Danny G. Worrell, Sixth Circuit Grants Motion to Pause WOTUS
Litigation Pending Supreme Court Review, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 27, 2017), http://www.lex
ology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=bec251e0-ed56-4982-8fb5-d483ade460f5 [https://perma
.cc/5GYT-D8VN].
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in early 2016.134 Although the Court did not release a full opinion men-
tioning agency deference, five justices told the EPA to halt implementation
of the rule.135 The rule, designed to cut back significant amounts of carbon
dioxide emissions from power plants, faced great animosity from Republi-
can state attorneys general and ultimately received enough skepticism
from five Supreme Court justices to merit a stay until the lower appeals
court reviewed it.136 President Trump now intends to abolish the rule
altogether before the appeals court can review it.137 Regardless of Presi-
dent Trump’s actions, the courts struck down a third major environmen-
tal rule intended to combat climate change.138 While the EPA procured
these rules as opposed to the SEC, the courts continue to show reluctance
in allowing agency deference on environmental issues. The Court may be
even more reluctant to allow for an inherently business orientated agency
to promulgate rules based on climate change.
In addition to the recent cases, the Court should continue to tilt
toward a conservative viewpoint of deregulation and less agency defer-
ence.139 Earlier in 2017, President Trump announced Neil Gorsuch will
replace the late Antonin Scalia on the Supreme Court.140 Regarding Justice
Gorsuch’s stance on allowing agencies more influence in the rulemaking
process, one commentator writes, “Gorsuch worries that too much defer-
ence to regulatory agencies can make the regulatory process arbitrary
and undemocratic. The Founders wanted Congress, not the executive
branch, to make the laws, he believes, and Chevron deference flies in the
face of that principle.”141
134 West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000, 1000 (2016) (order granting preliminary in-
junction).
135 Id.
136 Adam Liptak & Coral Davenport, Supreme Court Deals Blow to Obama’s Efforts to
Regulate Coal Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/10
/us/politics/supreme-court-blocks-obama-epa-coal-emissions-regulations.html [https://web
.archive.org/web/*/https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/10/us/politics/supreme-court-blocks
-obama-epa-coal-emissions-regulations.html].
137 See Brad Plumer, I asked legal experts how Trump could kill Obama’s Clean Power Plan.
Here’s what they said., VOX (Mar. 28, 2017), http://www.vox.com/energy-and-environ
ment/2017/2/23/14691438/trump-repeal-clean-power-plan [https://perma.cc/7NXG-2W68].
138 See West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000.
139 See Trump Picks Neil Gorsuch as Nominee for Supreme Court, BBC (Feb. 1, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38813137 [https://perma.cc/8ZP2-LHT6].
140 Id.
141 Timothy B. Lee, How Neil Gorsuch could rein in regulators like the EPA and the FCC,
VOX (Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.vox.com/new-money/2017/2/2/14473728/neil-gorsuch
-chevron-deference [https://perma.cc/75DE-X7UT].
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Should the SEC enforce a disclosure regime or draft a new rule
regarding the emissions of greenhouse gases, a plaintiff or state attorney
general would most likely challenge it, similar to the WOTUS and Clean
Power Plan suits,142 in a district court that favors less restrictive environ-
mental policies. An injunction would be granted and appealed to the
Supreme Court. Given the recent track record for agency deference and
the recent confirmation of Neil Gorsuch to the Court, the Supreme Court
probably favors less agency deference.
Thus, any rule or disclosure regime promulgated under current
law faces serious concern of being struck down as immaterial. The flexibil-
ity of current “materiality” law gives judges great deference for deciding
whether a rule is “arbitrary and capricious” or fails to follow Chevron defer-
ence. Given the current ideology of the Supreme Court, litigation could
prove fatal for a new rule or disclosure regime created under existing
Regulation S-K authority.
III. POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE POLICY VENUES
A proposed rule based on the 2010 SEC guidelines may not
survive judicial scrutiny. Instead of using Regulation S-K for requiring
corporations to disclose greenhouse gas emissions, environmentalists
may wish to seek other channels of lawmaking to achieve this desired
result. The following section will focus on legal or policy actions that
could be implemented on a federal or state level, as well as give recom-
mendations for engaging with corporations and investors directly.
A. Congressional Statute or Amendment
The first major option would consist of lobbying Congress for a
statute. Instead of proposing additional rules or new interpretations to
Regulation S-K, an explicit amendment to two authorizing statutes of the
SEC requiring corporate disclosure of greenhouse emissions effectively
achieves the goal of the 2010 SEC guidelines. The amendment could
require corporations to disclose greenhouse gas emissions as material for
investors and authorize promulgation of rules to enforce compliance.
The amendment would give the SEC the authority to regulate this
area of the law without any ambiguities and to propose rules for future
enforcement. Recent litigation for the WOTUS rule and the Clean Power
142 Liptak & Davenport, supra note 136.
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Plan demonstrates the shift toward reduced agency deference.143 Passing
a statute or amendment leaves less room for litigation and allows for a
clear path of requiring corporate disclosures.
A Congressional statute brings about sweeping change; yet, such
legislation may not be realistic absent political change. Passing climate
change legislation is difficult.144 The closest success for environmental re-
form came in 2009, when the House of Representatives passed the Ameri-
can Clean Energy and Security Act.145 “Cap and trade” legislation, which
would have created a market for carbon credits per individual and corpo-
rate users, appeared to have momentum under the Democratic, filibuster-
proof majority in the Senate and a Democratic president.146
Nevertheless, the bill never reached the Senate floor for a vote.147
Likewise, a potential statute for SEC regulations would face a more fierce
uphill battle in Congress today. As opposed to a supermajority held in 2010,
the Democratic Party does not hold a majority in either chamber of Con-
gress.148 While a statute or an amendment would be the easiest way to
enforce corporate disclosure, the political winds do not favor this option
for the immediate future as Donald Trump begins his presidency. The
president favors deregulation, and such a bill may not even receive a com-
mittee vote in the House of Representatives or Senate.149
B. State Government Lobbying
Alternatively, environmentalists could lobby state governments.
Congressional action is preferable, but given the federal political land-
scape, state involvement may result in incremental changes, as more
liberal states may be willing to pass stricter corporate laws.
143 See In re EPA and Dep’t of Def. Final Rule, 803 F.3d at 809; see also West Virginia v.
EPA, 136 S. Ct. at 1000.
144 Stephen Power, Senate Halts Effort to Cap CO2 Emissions, WALL ST. J. (July 23,
2010), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703467304575383373600358634
[https://perma.cc/JGD6-LGVV].
145 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
146 John M. Broder, House Passes Bill to Address Threat of Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES
(June 26, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/27/us/politics/27climate.html?_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/7A2H-ERGN].
147 Power, supra note 144.
148 See Eric Bradner, Republicans keep control of Congress, CNN (Nov. 19, 2016, 3:08 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/08/politics/congress-balance-of-power-2016-election/index
.html [https://perma.cc/47TJ-VSCG].
149 Plumer, supra note 137.
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While Democrats will be the most likely to favor this policy initia-
tive, only six states have pure Democratic control of both the legislature
and the office of governor.150 The other forty-four states have a Republi-
can check in either a legislative body, the executive, or both.151 Similar
to issues with changes in power at the federal level, state reform may
also be challenging.
Still, states such as California could pass a statute that serves as
an experimental model for all states in the future. In 2009, then Attorney
General of New York Andrew Cuomo called for corporations in his state
to disclose based on risk factors.152 Such a program could be used as a
framework for a national statute in a few years. Incremental change
would be incredibly slow on the state level, yet it appears to be a better
approach than lobbying Congress.
C. Engaging Corporations Directly
Instead of pursuing legal routes, environmental groups could con-
vince corporations to disclose greenhouse gas emissions. Despite a lack
of legal requirements through the SEC, large public corporations such as
Coca-Cola and American Airlines intend to become more sustainable.153
Nonmandatory disclosures could bring about a desirable outcome with-
out facing corporate backlash or litigation in the courts.
Corporate social responsibility is generally defined as “a company’s
sense of responsibility towards the community and environment (both
ecological and social) in which it operates.”154 Corporations can engage in
150 Stephen Wolf, Republicans now dominate state government, with 32 legislatures and
33 governors, DAILY KOS (Nov. 14, 2016, 1:09 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2016
/11/14/1598918/-Republicans-now-dominate-state-government-with-32-legislatures-and
-33-governors [https://perma.cc/PLM7-9RWK].
151 Id.
152 OFF. OF N.Y. ATT’Y GEN., STATEMENT FROM THE NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
ANDREW M. CUOMO ON THE SEC’S ACTION REGARDING THE DISCOURSE OF FINANCIAL RISKS
RELATED TO CLIMATE CHANGE (Jan. 27, 2010), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/statement
-new-york-state-attorney-general-andrew-m-cuomo-secs-action-regarding [https://perma
.cc/KAZ7-7MAL].
153 AMERICAN AIRLINES, Setting the bar for sustainability (2014), https://www.aa.com
/i18n/aboutUs/corporateResponsibility/environment.jsp [https://perma.cc/4PWW-CTGS];
COCA-COLA CO., Sustainability Update: Energy Efficiency and Climate, http://www.coca
-colacompany.com/our-company/sustainability-update-energy-efficiency-and-climate-pro
tection [https://perma.cc/8AT4-7RX3].
154 BUSINESS DICTIONARY, corporate social responsibility, http://www.businessdictionary
.com/definition/corporate-social-responsibility.html [https://perma.cc/8M6Q-WPXB].
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social responsibility “(1) through their waste and pollution reduction pro-
cesses, (2) by contributing educational and social programs, and (3) by
earning adequate returns on the employed resources.”155
Typically, a corporation will embark on these types of campaigns to
bring about social change and as a way of branding.156 Earlier cases involv-
ing corporate social responsibility included donations to schools.157 So long
as a corporation can phrase a responsibility as a way to enhance their busi-
ness model, courts will generally deem corporate social acts legal.158
Environmental groups may wish to pursue corporate social re-
sponsibility options with large corporations. Environmental groups have
been successful in driving the sustainability movement among large
corporations.159 For example, American Airlines, a large producer of carbon
dioxide emissions, included in their business model, “By proactively ad-
dressing environmental imperatives, we can chart a course for success
in what is increasingly a resource-constrained world. Our efforts—in the
air and on the ground—to operate more sustainably are also in line with
the expectations of our employees, customers and shareholders.”160 Being
“constantly on the lookout for innovative ways to reduce both costs and
emission,” American Airlines intends to reduce its carbon footprint by 2,100
metric tons of carbon dioxide, while saving the corporation $650,000
annually.161 American Airlines also intends to be carbon neutral in growth
by 2020.162
Other large corporations such as Coca-Cola and NASCAR con-
tinue to implement similar plans.163 Since 2006, Coca-Cola reduced its
carbon footprint from 863.5 to 776.7 total metric tons of greenhouse gas
emissions.164 Since 2008, NASCAR planted nearly 400,000 trees and used
155 Id.
156 Brian Hughes, Why Corporate Social Responsibility is Essential for Brand Strategy,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brian-hughes/why
-corporate-social-resp_b_9282246.html [https://perma.cc/C6FJ-SM3L].
157 See AP Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953).
158 See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
159 SUSTAINABILITY DEGREES, The 14 Most Influential Sustainability NGOs (July 1, 2014),
http://www.sustainabilitydegrees.com/blog/most-influential-sustainability-ngos/ [https://
perma.cc/B7G5-WQ6A].
160 AMERICAN AIRLINES, supra note 153.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 COCA-COLA CO., supra note 153; NASCAR, NASCAR Green—An Industry Effort, http://
green.nascar.com/nascar-green-an-industry-effort/ [https://perma.cc/ZEQ7-6KZ8] (last
visited Nov. 12, 2017).
164 COCA-COLA CO., supra note 153.
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200,000 gallons of recycled oil.165 These social changes came to these
companies without the need for a statute or Regulation S-K. Regardless
of political climate, this route probably is the more realistic and efficient
method in furtherance of the goal of reducing greenhouse gases.
Furthermore, some corporations have started to disclose greenhouse
gas emissions.166 Global 500 companies collectively contribute approxi-
mately ten percent of greenhouse gas emissions and have already publically
disclosed.167 The Director of Sustainability at Thomson Reuters states:
[T]here’s an urgency to curb greenhouse gas emissions
worldwide so we can reduce the impact of climate change . . .
While we hope this report accelerates the discussion related
to GHG reductions among the Global 500, it’s important
to remember that as global consumers of industry, we all
play a part in this conversation.168
Nevertheless, up to ninety percent of greenhouse gas emissions continue
to remain unreported.169
Instead of lobbying Congress, environmental activists may face
better policy changes by directly interacting with the corporations them-
selves. These groups, such as Ceres, continue to make significant ad-
vancements in the sustainability movement.170 If environmental groups
wish to have corporations disclose greenhouse gas emissions, the propos-
als need to be framed as a way of better branding, raising profits, and
serving the community as a community leader.171
At least ten percent of corporations disclose on a voluntary basis.172
Now, environmental groups need to start lobbying large corporations on
the same scale as American Airlines and Coca-Cola to commit to making
greenhouse gas disclosure plans. In doing so, a new corporate norm of
disclosing greenhouse gas emissions may occur without a single revision
to Regulation S-K.
165 NASCAR, supra note 163.
166 THOMSON REUTERS, Thomson Reuters Releases Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data On
Global 500 Companies (Dec. 22, 2014), http://thomsonreuters.com/en/press-releases/2014
/thomson-reuters-releases-greenhouse-gas-emissions-data-on-global-500-companies.html
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D. Investor Attitudes and the Political Process
At the end of the day, investors care primarily about making
money.173 When becoming an investor, an individual decides to purchase
a share of stock hoping the value will increase and turn a profit.174 Even
if public corporations are required to disclose greenhouse gas emissions,
stockholders or potential investors may not simply care about such
impact.175 While impact investing may be a trend in the future, tradition
dictates that stockholders care only about financial returns.176
For example, British Petroleum’s stock reached near $60 per share
in March 2010.177 The stock price took a deep hit after the B.P. Deep Water
Horizon crisis and never recovered.178 Six years later, the stock trades for
$33 per share.179 Alternatively, the stock of Exxon Mobile rose $26 per
share during that time period.180 The Deep Water Horizon crisis led to
intense public scrutiny in the media; nevertheless, investors continued
to purchase stock in oil reserves despite the risk of another pollution occur-
ring down the line.181
While only one case study, this behavior demonstrates that en-
vironmental issues may not exist at the forefront of an investor’s mind
when deciding to purchase stock. If a crisis happens with one company,
then an investor could purchase stock from a competitor in the same
field. As environmental investment consultant Rory Sullivan suggests,
reporting greenhouse gas emissions may not be enough.182 He states,
“Companies have been quick to make changes that can be justified in
173 Ed Sappin, To Make Investors Care About the Environment Show Them The Money!,
ENTREPRENEUR (June 1, 2016), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/274618 [https://perma
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174 Id.
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=1 [https://perma.cc/3HFS-YMZD] (last visited Nov. 12, 2017).
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181 Scott Gamm, BP Stock Bruised but Cheap Five Years After Deep Horizon Spill, THE
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traditional cost-benefit terms . . . However, in the absence of other
pressure for action, that only takes you a certain part of the way.”183
Mr. Sullivan’s point suggests that political pressure ultimately
needs to be the course of action. Incremental changes could be made in
the markets, but a top-down approach may only come from political
action. Some corporations disclose, but a vast majority do not.184 If such
an approach is desired, environmentalists should look toward the politi-
cal process.
Jay Clayton, President Trump’s choice to head the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”), may be sympathetic toward environmen-
tal causes.185 As an attorney at Sullivan & Cromwell, his name is listed in
a memo from attorneys at the firm encouraging clients to disclose green-
house gas emissions to the SEC.186 The memo expressly mentions that it
may be within the best interest of corporations to start preparing Regula-
tion S-K disclosure forms with greenhouse gas emissions.187
While Mr. Clayton’s views may be favorable toward disclosure,
President Trump’s vision may take a different approach, as climate change
appears to not be a top priority for his administration.188 Though his cam-
paign platform did not explicitly state that he will deregulate the SEC for
environmental issues, President Trump stated:
We will get the bureaucracy out of the way of innovation,
so we can pursue all forms of energy . . . . The government
should not pick winners and losers. Instead, it should
remove obstacles to exploration. Any market has ups and
downs, but lifting these draconian barriers will ensure that
we are no longer at the mercy of global markets.189
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In keeping with this campaign promise, President Trump signed
an executive order in January 2017 issuing that “it is important that for
every one new regulation issued, at least two prior regulations be identi-
fied for elimination, and that the cost of planned regulations be prudently
managed and controlled through a budgeting process.”190 In addition,
President Trump signed executive orders allowing for the construction
of the Keystone XL Pipeline and Dakota Access pipeline.191 Congress
recently repealed the Stream Protection Rule, a regulation designed to
protect waterways from coal runoff.192 President Trump also intends to
scrap both the Clean Power Plan and WOTUS.193 These actions suggest
President Trump, committed to reducing the size of government, will not
take action on SEC regulations for corporate greenhouse gas disclosure.
Due to political roadblocks and investor indifference, the path ahead
may be challenging for environmentalists if the goal is for corporate dis-
closure. These groups could become more engaged in the political process
and work to elect climate change candidates at the federal and state level,
or find ways to change investor attitudes or corporate norms. However,
public opinion might not be strong enough to allow such changes in po-
litical culture.
Environmentalist organizations and lobbyists may be well served
to engage in political grassroots by attempting to shift public and politi-
cal opinions. At the end of the day, environmentalists wish to reduce the
amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, and any incremental
changes in public opinion, whether through marketing or advertising, may
be an effective solution to fulfilling that goal.
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CONCLUSION
“Materiality” does not seem as clear as one would think. As much
as there may be a debate over whether the eating habits or health of a
CEO should be disclosed to investors, a divide also exists among environ-
mentalists and the business community regarding whether greenhouse
gases should be considered “material” for disclosure requirements. Case
law and current political winds do not favor groups who seek federal
regulations for disclosing greenhouse gas emissions. The courts could
strike down a rule, the current administration may reject the idea alto-
gether, and Congress does not seem to have the appetite for climate
change legislation.
Environmental groups have a strong argument for having a broad
definition of “materiality;” however, their goals at this time may be unreal-
istic. These organizations need to be patient and understand that it might
take time to procure legislative or regulatory changes. Whether by
directly soliciting corporations or becoming more engaged in the political
system, opportunities exist for environmental groups to raise awareness
of the issue. While these groups may not get the top-down blanket ap-
proach they so desire with a rule promulgated from the 2010 interpreta-
tive guidelines concept, incremental steps in their fight against climate
change can be accomplished.
Alternatively, environmentalists may need to become creative by
looking at other market approaches for reducing greenhouse gases. At
the end of the day, the goal of these groups is to ensure fewer greenhouse
gases enter the atmosphere. Whether corporate disclosure through Reg-
ulation S-K or some other completely different option presents itself, the
process in theory would not matter. Regardless, environmental activists
may need to become more engaged in the political process long term or
seek to change investing attitudes and corporate norms.
